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THE SOCIAL COST OF CONTRACT 
David A. Hoffman* & Cathy Hwang**
When private parties perform contracts, the public bears some of the costs. But 
what happens when society confronts unexpected contractual risks? During the 
Covid-19 pandemic, completing particular contracts—such as following 
through with weddings, conferences, and other large gatherings—will greatly 
increase the risk of rapidly spreading disease. A close reading of past cases 
illustrates that when social hazards sharply increase after formation, courts have 
sometimes rejected, reformed, and reinterpreted contracts so that parties who 
breach to reduce external harms are not left holding the bag. 
This Essay builds on that observation in making two contributions. 
Theoretically, it characterizes contracts as bargains that always involve the 
public. Law has three tools at hand to govern contract’s social cost: delineating 
subject matter about which parties can bargain, interacting with parties as a 
regulator, and, finally, interpreting and reforming in court. Post-hoc 
consideration of social costs is the least well-known, and most unsettled, mode 
of governing contract externalities. We ground that technique in its history as 
a specialized application of the law of contract public policy. Practically, this 
Essay advises parties negotiating whether and how to perform to consider the 
public’s health, since history teaches that, at least some of the time, courts will 
too. 
* Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.
** Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. We are grateful to
Kevin Daly, Olivia Roat, and Sherrod Smith for excellent research assistance. Bob 
Hillman, Jon Lipson, Dorothy Lund, David Noll, and Nate Oman provided helpful 
comments. 
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In September of 1916, the Connecticut Fair Association breached its 
contractual obligation to “promote and manage a baby show” where “babies 
were in some manner to be exhibited.”1 Walter Hanford, who was to have 
supplied the infants for the show, sued.2 
Ordinarily, Hanford v. Connecticut Fair Association would have been a 
straightforward breach-of-contract case.3 But 1916 was no normal year: New 
York City saw its first cluster of poliomyelitis, a virus that mostly affected 
children, often paralyzing or killing them.4  
 Indeed, the disease was “so widespread and so serious as to make 
assemblies of children . . . highly dangerous to the health of the children of the 
community; and by reason of said facts it was contrary to public policy to hold 
a baby show of the nature.” 5  The Association breached the contract—
allegedly—to slow the spread of the fearsome virus. 
Nevertheless, Hanford, suing for damages, had a seemingly easy case: The 
Association’s performance was neither impossible nor impracticable. 
Moreover, the contract was clear: the defendant’s obligation to pay was 
absolute and unqualified. In other words, even if it breached the contract to 
further the public’s interest, the Association still owed Hanford money. 
In a passage with special resonance in 2020, the court disagreed. It would 
neither: 
require the performance, [n]or award damages for a breach, of a 
contract in which the public have so great an interest as the 
1 Hanford v. Conn. Fair Ass’n, 103 A. 838 (Conn. 1918). Hanford is a case that 
used to appear in many contract casebooks, but today is rarely studied or taught. 
Patterson (1935), Corbin (1921), Shepherd (1957), Patterson (1941) all include the 
case, but only Murray of the modern books currently does.  
2  You may ask: what is the point of a baby show? From a 1933 newspaper, 
reporting on an exhibition by the same firm, the answer is to crown, among others, 
the fattest baby, best brother and sister, and, of course, overall best baby. See 
IRVINGTON GAZETTE (June 23, 1933), available at 
https://news.hrvh.org/veridian/?a=d&d=firv19330623.1.5&. 
3 In those pre-War years, contract law was formalist, and advocated straight-ahead 
interpretative doctrines with few excuses. Samuel Williston, 2 THE LAW OF 
CONTRACTS, CHAPTER XXI: GENERAL RULES FOR THE INTERPRETATION OR 
CONSTRUCTION OF CONTRACTS AND THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE, 1157-1278 
(1920); Jennifer Camero, Mission Impracticable: The Impossibility of Commercial 
Impracticability, 13 U. N.H. L. REV. 1, 2-4 (2015) (reviewing limited origins of 
impracticability doctrine for commercial parties). 
4  Whatever Happened to Polio, SMITHSONIAN NAT’L MUSEUM OF AM. HIST. 
BEHRING CTR., https://amhistory.si.edu/polio/americanepi/communities.htm (last 
visited June 22, 2020). 
5 Hanford, 103 A. 838. 
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preservation of health, if the health is in fact endangered, any more 
than it would require one to be performed the tendency of which 
was immoral or one which interfered with the right of everyone to 
earn a livelihood by a lawful occupation . . .  The baby show . . . 
would be highly dangerous to health, and this is just what the parties 
have agreed to promote and carry out for their mutual profit.6 
There is no general public health exception to contract enforcement—but 
the court found one.7  And while the cases on how to adjudicate excuse based 
on public health risks are rare,8 Hanford is not the only example of its kind. 
Cases considering public health distortions of ordinary contractual doctrine 
have resulted from nearly every epidemic of the last two centuries.9 
Hanford and other cases excusing, reinterpreting, and reforming 
performance obligations on public policy grounds show how the public’s 
interest interacts with private contracting. On a daily basis, private parties enter 
into contracts—to use a website, to lease an apartment, to host a family 
reunion, or to merge two companies into one. And while seats at the contract-
6 Hanford, 103 A. at 839. 
7 To be sure, there are many cases in which sickness was held to discharge 
performance of a personal services contract.  See, e.g., Green v. Gilbert, 21 Wis. 395, 
400 (1867) ("[s]ickness is sufficient to excuse delay, or . . . nonperformance of contracts 
for personal services, and is regarded as [an] act of God.”); Wolfe v. Howes, 20 N.Y. 
197 (1859) (quantum meruit available for work performed); Ryan v. Dayton, 25 Conn. 
188 (1856) (excuse for missing work).  There are also cases where market disrupted by 
local sickness result in prices that are distorted, and contracts later are found 
unenforceable.  See, e.g., Kirkland v. Tex. Express Co., 57 Miss. 316 (1879) (setting the 
contract set when price was set during yellow fever epidemic and no longer reflected 
fair market value). But there is no free-floating rule that contracts must make society 
healthier, or that contracts that hurt society’s health cannot be enforced. 
8 In discussing a set of cases requiring schools to pay teachers who were displaced 
by various diseases that had closed schools, Corbin comments that such “decisions 
may be justified on the ground that the community is better able to carry the financial 
risk than is the individual teacher. Furthermore, even though the school district is 
legally justified in closing the schools, the closure is for the benefit of the community 
at large and not just for the school or the individual teacher.” ARTHUR LINTON 
CORBIN & JOSEPH M. PERILLO, 14 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 77.7 (Rev. ed. 1993). 
9 See, e.g., Lakeman v. Pollard, 43 Me. 463 (1856) (quantum meruit for laborer who 
left work during cholera outbreak); Kirkland, 57 Miss. 316  (yellow fever)); Sullivan v. 
Knauth, 115 N.E. 460 (N.Y. 1917) (holding the possibility of forgery was a defense 
when a bank cashed lost travelers checks while traveler was quarantined during a 
yellow fever outbreak); Tong Chi Ying v Shum Ping Kuen Benson, [2010] HKEC 
1479 (no extra damages for breach of lease contract during SARS, though parties were 
urged to compromise); Dynamic Mach. Works, Inc. v. Mach. & Elec. Consultants, 
Inc., 352 F. Supp. 2d 83 (D. Mass.), certified question answered, 444 Mass. 768, 831 
N.E.2d 875 (2005) (finding no excusable delay despite SARS epidemic). 
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negotiation table are primarily occupied by the contracting parties themselves, 
one place is always implicitly reserved for another party: the public. 
Others have written compellingly about the impact of the public on private 
contracts.10 Scholars have described divorce as a “bargain in the shadow of the 
law,” for instance, and a corporate acquisition as a deal with “three parties at 
the table: the buyer, the seller, and the government.”11 This Essay adds an 
important twist to that literature and updates it for the current pandemic 
climate. It focuses on the ways that private law’s contracts become public law’s 
charges. 
Contracts flourish when the externalities they create—which are 
inevitable—are acceptable to the public. 12  The government monitors that 
acceptability through three main mechanisms: limits on the subject of 
contracts, regulatory intervention, and the contract-enforcement process in 
courts. If a contract survives the scrutiny of the first two types of gatekeeping, 
the third usually offers superficial review: courts almost always enforce 
contracts even when the contracts create third-party harms.13 
Contract enforcement remains the norm today. Corporate lawyers, for 
instance, have rushed to assure their clients that their contracts will be enforced 
as written, even in the current pandemic.14 In a client alert, law firm Willkie Farr 
& Gallagher noted that courts tend to “construe force majeure provisions 
narrowly”—thereby suggesting that parties could not expect to back out of 
10 Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The 
Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979) (describing the role that laws, regulations, and 
courts play in private divorce settlements); Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 
TEX. L. REV. 227 (2010) (describing how private parties to acquisition agreements 
modify their deals to account for regulatory treatment); Cathy Hwang & Matthew 
Jennejohn, Contractual Depth (June 20, 2020 draft) (manuscript on file with author) 
(describing how contracts between private parties are written with regulators as in 
intended audience).  
11 Mnookin, supra note 10; Fleischer, supra note 10. 
12 The law-and-economics analysis of social costs, from which this essay’s title was 
drawn, obviously considers contracts to be in some sense a solution to externalities, 
not a cause.  R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960) 
13 Courts rarely decline to enforce contracts as written. But those circumstances 
are narrowly drawn—the relatively disfavored defenses of unconscionability, public 
policy, duress, mistake, and the like.  With the exception of public policy, none focuses 
on broader social consequences.  
14 Law firm guidance has become so voluminous at the Stanford University’s Rock 
Center for Corporate Governance has collected all the law firm guidance in a 
searchable database. Since the end of January 2020, law firms have produced 95 
memos addressing contract breach, renegotiation, and other issues related to the 
pandemic. See STANFORD LAW SCHOOL COVID-19 MEMO DATABASE, 
https://covidmemo.law.stanford.edu (last visited Apr. 16, 2020). 
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contracts using force majeure clauses.15 Law firms Sidley Austin and White & 
Case offered similar advice.16  Meanwhile, other major law firms have also 
advised their clients that the increased cost of performing a contract does not 
excuse contract performance, 17  some noting that pandemics may not be 
considered unforeseeable.18 In other words, the coronavirus pandemic poses 
no special problems for contract law, at least according to its most sophisticated 
practitioners. 
We disagree. Sometimes, private parties’ performance of their contracts 
greatly increases the negative externalities borne by the public, in ways no one 
contemplated when the contract was formed. In the past, when the public’s 
share of the burden has increased dramatically, particularly in the case of 
disease, courts have declined to enforce contracts as written. Instead, courts 
15 Tariq Mundiya et al., Precedent in Unprecedented Times: Contractual Performance and 
Defenses in the Age of COVID-19, WILLKIE FARR & GALLAGHER LLP (March 16, 2020), 
https://www.willkie.com/-/media/files/publications/2020/03/precedent-in-
unprecedented-times.pdf (defining force majeure as “a contract provision that excuses 
a party’s nonperformance when an ‘act of God’ or some other extraordinary event 
prevents a party from fulfilling its obligations”). 
16 Sidley Austin LLP, COVID-19 and the Impact on English Law Governed Contracts – 
Force Majeure and Frustration (March 16, 2020), 
https://www.sidley.com/en/insights/newsupdates/2020/03/covid-19-and-the-
impact-on-english-law-governed-contracts--force-majeure-and-frustration (advising 
clients that both force majeure clauses and common law defenses “have a high bar to 
success”); Mark Clarke et al., Suspending Contractual Performance in Response to the 
Coronavirus Outbreak, WHITE & CASE LLP (Feb. 18, 2020), 
https://www.whitecase.com/publications/alert/suspending-contractual-
performance-response-coronavirus-outbreak (warning clients not to simply cease 
performance because an incorrect assertion of force majeure “may amount to a breach 
(or anticipatory breach) of the contract” and “depending upon the severity of that 
breach, the aggrieved counterparty could be entitled to claim damages or even to 
terminate the contract.”). 
17 WILMER CUTLER PICKERING HALE AND DORR LLP, Revisiting Force Majeure and 
Dispute Resolution Clauses in Light of the Recent Outbreak of the Coronavirus (Feb. 27, 2020), 
https://www.wilmerhale.com/en/insights/client-alerts/20200227-revisiting-force-
majeure-and-dispute-resolution-clauses-in-light-of-the-recent-outbreak-of-the-
coronavirus (noting that “a mere increase in the price of supplies or labor, by itself” is 
insufficient to free parties from their contractual obligations); Wai Ming Yap et al., Can 
Companies Invoke the Force Majeure Clause in the Context of COVID-19?, MORGAN, LEWIS 
& BOCKIUS LLP (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/can-
companies-invoke-the-force-majeure-clause-in-the-context-of-covid19 (reminding 
clients that they generally will not be excused from performance “simply because 
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have sometimes reformed contracts to ensure that the burden borne by society 
is acceptable.  
The coronavirus pandemic is another moment when ordinary contracts 
may become extraordinarily risky for the public. 19 Gatherings—which some 
contracting parties have not canceled due to a fear of lost deposits, for 
instance—have caused clusters of viral spread in many communities. Now-
infamous examples include a corporate conference in Massachusetts, 20  a 
funeral and subsequent birthday party in Chicago,21 a church service in a suburb 
of Seoul,22 and a choir practice in Washington state,23 which have all been 
identified as events that caused widespread disease. Contracts for future 
performance—like the residential housing agreements signed by many college 
students today—would bring people together into close proximity and could 
spread disease. 
This Essay makes two contributions to the literature. 24  The first is 
theoretical. Building on literatures in contracts, contract design, and other 
fields, it shows how the public participates in private contracting. It focuses 
19 For other works in the rapidly growing tradition of “Covid and Contract,” see 
Jonathan Lipson, Essay, Contracting Covid: Private Order and Public Good (June 2020 draft 
on file with authors); [Add] 
20 Farah Stockman & Kim Barker, How a Premier U.S. Drug Company Became a Virus 
‘Super Spreader’, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 12, 2020), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/12/us/coronavirus-biogen-boston-
superspreader.html. 
21 Robin Goist, ‘Super-Spreader’ Attending Funeral, Party in Chicago Resulted in 16 




22 Youjin Shin, Bonnie Berkowitz, & Min Joo Kim, How a South Korean Church 
Helped Fuel the Spread of the Coronavirus, WASH. POST (March 25, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2020/world/coronavirus-south-korea-
church/. 
23 Richard Read, A Choir Decided to Go Ahead with Rehearsal. Now Dozens of Members 
Have COVID-19 and Two Are Dead, L.A. TIMES (March 29, 2020), 
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2020-03-29/coronavirus-choir-
outbreak. 
24 For other examples of Covid-19 and contract papers, see Hanoch Dagan & 
Ohad Somech, When Contract’s Basic Assumptions Fail: From Rose 2d to COVID-19 (June 
9, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3605411; Ian Ayres, Corona and Contract, 
BALKINIZATION BLOG (March 23, 2020, 11:40 AM), 
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2020/03/corona-and-contract.html (arguing that 
consumers should pay some cancellation costs in light of public health benefits that 
might accrue).  
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particularly on the final gatekeeping function of courts, which usually 
enforce—but can reform—contracts.   
The second contribution is practical. In extraordinary times, courts 
sometimes do not enforce contracts as-written, in an effort to protect public 
health. Instead, courts turn to half-loaf and compromise solutions, including 
contract reformation and more equitable damage remedies. When deciding 
whether to perform contracts—or to hold counterparties to performance—
parties should realize that previous courts can and have embraced compromise, 
rather than rote enforcement. Newly dominant modes of dispute resolution 
make such solutions more likely than ever. 
The remainder of this Essay proceeds as follows. Part I shows how the 
public influences private contracts through three main mechanisms: defining 
legal subject matter, regulation, and contract interpretation. Part II focuses on 
the contract interpretation piece. It shows that in response to contracts that 
increase the public’s risks, courts have sometimes reformed, rather than 
enforced, contracts. Public health crises, like the current pandemic, are 
particularly salient in this set of cases: courts excuse performance or reach for 
interpretations that align with equitable solutions. Part III discusses 
implications, including remedies for breach. In the modern litigation 
environment, which is dominated by mass adjudication through non-traditional 
tribunals, courts are unlikely to take a textual approach to enforcing contracts 
breached during pandemic times. Instead, they will likely dole out rough justice 
through arbitration and like fora that promote compromise, all but ensuring 
that breachers will not be held to the specific damages of any particular 
individual contract. 
I. THE PARTIES AND THE PUBLIC
Contracts begin with private deals, but are bounded by public interests. 
An apartment lease is a good example. The landlord and tenant—both 
private parties—can agree to many little details that the law cares little about, 
such as how warm to keep the apartment in winter or how large the tenant’s 
dog can be. But there are limits to what they can bargain for, too: occupancy 
limits, damages for early ease termination, notice of lead paint, and eviction 
rules are obvious examples.25  
25 See e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 235-f(3)–(4) (McKinney 1983) (establishing 
occupancy limits for residential leases and rental agreements); § 227(E) (establishing a 
landlord’s duty to mitigate damages if a tenant vacates an apartment in violation of the 
lease).  
  
The Social  Cost  o f  Contract  9 
When laws set the boundaries of what parties can agree to, parties are said 
to “bargain in the shadow of the law.”26 But boundary-setting is not the only 
way that the public influences private contracts.  
The public also exerts its influence through contract enforcement. Suppose 
that the parties agree in a lease that the tenant may use the premises as a meth 
lab. If a dispute arises, the public has another chance to intervene—through a 
court, which can find that the contract is unenforceable because it is illegal.27 
This Part explores how the public influences private contracts. Part I.A. 
show why the public gets involved in contracts between private parties at all: 
contracts between private parties inevitably expose the public to negative 
externalities, and the public has an interest in keeping those negative 
externalities at an acceptable level. Part I.B. explores the ways that the public 
gets involved. Although the public’s reach is tentacular, this Article focuses a 
few concrete examples: ex ante guardrails that force parties to bargain in the 
shadow of the law, the role of regulators, and the role of courts. 
A. Private law and public externalities
It is well-understood—in both kindergarten and in the halls of academia—
that one person’s actions might have an impact on others.28 
These impacts—or externalities—can, of course, be positive.29 A few years 
ago, American humorist Dave Sedaris, like many, developed a drive to meet the 
daily step goals set by his Fitbit pedometer.30 His eagerness to hit his daily step 
goals soon turned into an obsession with picking up roadside trash on long 
daily walks. This delighted his neighbors in West Sussex, England, were so 
pleased by the cleanliness that they named a trash truck for Sedaris.31  
Many private actions and deals result in benefits for third parties, from the 
trivial to the profound: your agreement with a painter to brighten your shutters 
makes your neighbor feel better about her house; your purchase of a vaccine 
from the pharmacist increases the likelihood of herd immunity. But often, the 
26 Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 10, at 968. 
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
28 James M. Buchanan & William Craig Stubblebine, Externality, 29 ECONOMICA 
371 (1962). 
29 Id. 
30 David Sedaris, Stepping Out, THE NEW YORKER (June 23, 2014), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/06/30/stepping-out-3. 
31 Tim Dowling, David Sedaris? Who? Oh, You Mean the Local Litter-Picker, THE 
GUARDIAN (July 31, 2014), 
https://www.theguardian.com/books/shortcuts/2014/jul/31/david-sedaris-litter-
picker-rubbish-waste-vehicle-pig-pen-west-sussex; Brett M. Frischmann & Mark A. 
Lamley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257 (2008).  
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impact of one person’s actions can also cause negative externalities. Pollution, 
cigarette smoke, and construction are ready examples.32  
Contracts are no different. Private contracts create externalities for the 
public, and the public—through law, regulation, and contract interpretation—
is very interested in keeping those externalities to an acceptable level.33 We are 
not the first to notice that contracts create externalities, nor the first to notice 
that the public exerts influence on private party contract. We briefly recap these 
literatures here, before turning to our novel argument: that when externalities 
to the public spike, the public can step in through courts.   
There is a relatively nascent literature on the externalities of contracts.34 
Aditi Bagchi’s Other People’s Contracts provides a general overview.35  Bagchi 
describes private contracts as potentially creating negative externalities for 
unrelated third parties and argues that contract doctrine currently fails to 
protect third parties sufficiently from these harms.36 She proposes that when a 
contract is ambiguous, courts should interpret the contract with an eye toward 
32 Lisa Grow Sun & Brigham Daniels, Mirrored Externalities, 90 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 135 (2014). 
33 Alternatively, contract law seeks to maintain efficient level of externalities. 
34 See generally Kishanthi Parella,  Protecting Contract’s Hidden Parties, (July 2020 draft 
on file with authors) (proposing a new form of liability for contract externalities that 
cause third -parties physical harm); Jonathan Lipson, Essay, Contracting Covid: Private 
Order and Public Good (June 2020 draft on file with authors);  FARSHAD GHODOOSI, 
INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION 
(2017); Jan Smits, The Expanding Circle of Contract Law, 27 STELLENBOSCH L. REV. 227, 
237 (2016) (arguing that courts should enjoin contracts with socially destructive effects 
on third-parties);  Aditi Bagchi, Other People’s Contracts, 32 YALE J. REG. 211, 243 (2015); 
Benjamin Porat, Contracts to the Detriment of a Third Party: Developing a Model Inspired by 
Jewish Law, 62 U. TORONTO L.J. 347 (2012) (focusing on third party business harms); 
Adam Badawi, Harm, Ambiguity, and the Regulation of Illegal Contracts, 17 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 2 (2009); Note, A Law and Economics Look at Contracts against Public Policy, 119
Harv. L. Rev. 1445 (Mar. 2006);  F.H. Buckley, Perfectionism, 13 SUP. CT. ECON. REV.
133, 143 (2005); James Rooks, Let the Sun Shine In, TRIAL (June 2003);  Juliet P.
Kostritsky, Illegal Contracts and Efficient Deterrence: A Study in Modern Contract Theory, 74
IOWA L. REV. 115 (1988); Ryan M. Philp, Comment, Silence at Our Expense: Balancing
Safety and Secrecy in Non-Disclosure Agreements, 33 SETON HALL. L. REV. 845, 857
(2003) (arguing that courts should refuse to enforce NDAs that threaten the public
welfare); Carol M. Best, At What Price Silence: Are Confidentiality Agreements Enforceable?,
25 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 627, 672 (1999) (arguing for whistleblower protection in
the case of public hazards). Notably, as Professor Jonathan Lipson pointed out to us,
bankruptcy scholars have focused on the externalities created by contract in
considering issues such as creditor priority for decades.
35 Bagchi, supra note 34, at 193. 
36 Id. at 215. 
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protecting third-party interests, particularly when harms are discrete and 
previously recognized by law.37  
At the heart of Bagchi’s account is her understanding of the proper focus 
of contract jurists. For example, she notes that contract philosophers tend to 
think that contracts are purely private law, so courts should consider only “the 
rights and duties of litigants toward each other” when resolving disputes.38 
Contract economists also embrace a version of this: they argue that judges 
should “consider only the contractual intentions of those party to an 
agreement.”39 In part, this party-centric view of contract interpretation exists 
because scholars  think that laws mitigate the public harms of private 
contracts—so there is little third-party harm mitigation left for courts to do.40  
While Bagchi’s article takes an important first step toward thinking about 
how contracts affect third parties, another paper, by Erik Lampmann and one 
of us (Hoffman), takes an even more expansive view of the intersection of 
public harm and private contract.41 This work argues that “hush contracts”—
non-disclosure agreements that suppress information about sexual 
wrongdoing—harm society by, for instance, allowing society to believe it has 
remedied issues of sexual harassment and abuse, insulating perpetrators from 
accountability, and allowing perpetrators to continuing harming new victims.42 
Thus, even when private parties mutually assent to them, courts should be leery 
of enforcing them because the costs of hush contracts expand beyond the 
signatories themselves.43 
Similarly, Jonathan Lipson argues that lessons from supply chain 
agreements ought to be employed to understand the public health 
consequences of contracting. 44  In the supply chain context, as he has 
explored,45 firms use terms to manage reputational risk (such as being branded 
as a user of child labor) and ensure consistency across networks. During the 
Covid-19 pandemic, firms may employ supply contract terms to make sure that 
their partners adhere to safety guidelines, and then turn around and use those 
37 Id. at 212. 
38 Id. at 219. 
39 Id. at 220. 
40 Id. at 219–220.  
41 David A. Hoffman & Erik Lampmann, Hushing Contracts, 97 WASH. U. L. REV. 
165 (2019). 
42 Id. at 175–77.  
43 Id. at 169–70.  
44 Lipson, supra note 34. 
45 Jonathan C. Lipson, Promising Justice: Contract (As) Social Responsibility, 2019 WIS. 
L. REV. 1109 (2019).
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guidelines as the grist for enforceable Covid-19 waivers.46 Lipson argues that 
such waivers should be enforceable only if they comply with protocols which 
make the spread of disease less likely. 
Another important literature focuses on the interaction between private 
bargaining and public influence. Perhaps the most influential paper in this 
tradition is Robert Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser’s Bargaining in the Shadow of 
the Law.47 In it, they describe how the law creates the boundaries of acceptable 
bargaining in a divorce.48 Importantly, Mnookin and Kornhauser differentiate 
between situations where the couple has children and where they do not. 
Specifically, they note that “[w]hen there are minor children, the state obviously 
has broader interests than dispute settlement. The state also has a responsibility 
for child protection.”49 In other words, Mnookin and Kornhauser recognize 
that private divorce settlements always happen within the boundaries of the 
law, but when there are additional state interests involved—such as the interests 
of children—the law reaches its tentacles a little deeper into the parties’ private 
contract.  
Vic Fleischer, in his article Regulatory Arbitrage, takes a more modern stab at 
this idea of the relationship between private bargains and public interest. 
Fleischer’s article describes the role of regulators in corporate acquisitions. He 
aptly describes the typical corporate acquisition as having “three parties, not 
two, at the negotiating table: the buyer, the seller, and the government—
typically acting through statutes and regulations written in advance of the 
deal.” 50  Buyer and sellers often plan around those regulatory issues by 
restructuring their deals—this often involves a change in the form of the deal, 
rather than a change in its economic substance.51 In other words, how the 
government will treat a deal for purposes of, say, taxation will change how the 
parties choose to structure the deal.  
The government’s role is not static. A deal’s regulatory treatment may vary 
across jurisdictions and may even depend on which particular government 
bureaucrat is reviewing the deal. As Fleischer puts it, “the politically well-
connected can bargain more effectively . . . over the regulatory treatment of a 
deal.”52 Because of this, the relationship between the parties to the contract and 
46 Lipson, supra note 32, at 14. 
47 Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 10.  
48 Id. at 950.   
49 Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 10, at 957. 
50 Fleischer, supra note 10, at 238; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Private Life 
of Public Law, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2029 (2005). 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 230. 
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the government may be a dynamic dance that runs for the duration of the deal’s 
lifecycle. 
Others, too—including Bagchi, in a separate article, and one of us (Hwang) 
with Matthew Jennejohn—have explored the ways in which regulators 
influence contract terms, sometimes directly influencing what parties put into 
their contracts.53  
The argument in this Essay depends on an interweaving of these two 
literatures—on contract’s externalities and on the public/private interplay in 
contracting. We agree that contracts create externalities—but not only for third 
parties who have “legally-protected interests,” as Bagchi would have it. Instead, 
like Hoffman and Lampmann, we argue that contracts externalize risk on the 
general public. 
A merger, for instance, might create a monopoly, raising prices for 
consumers. A wedding in a public park deprives the public of using the park 
and might reduce the number of parking spaces around the park. Airbnb users 
reduce the supply of rental units, thereby driving up rental costs. A contract for 
the sale of prescription pain medication externalizes the social risks of 
addiction.  
Because of these externalities, the general public has many reasons to 
intervene in private contracting—and it does, all the time. And the role of 
government in limiting contract’s externalities is more important than when the 
magnitude of externality changes between the time of the contract’s signing 
(which as an ordinary time) and a later date (during, say, a pandemic). 
B. Government intervention into private contracts
The public, reasonably, has a strong interest in intervening in private
contracts that shift costs to the public. Although the public can intervene in 
various ways, this Part focuses only on three common ways: by setting the 
boundaries of acceptable private ordering ex ante, through regulation (which 
often causes parties to change their contracts to ensure compliance), and 
through judicial interpretation of private contracts.54  
53 See Aditi Bagchi, Interpreting Contracts in a Regulatory State, 54 U.S.CF. L. REV. 35, 
41 (2020) (noting that “our modern regulatory state can, and sometimes does, directly 
regulate those terms”); Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 10, at 30.  
54 There are other ways in which “publicness” infuses into private contracting. 
For example, as Professor Jonathan Lipson points out to us, reputation and notoriety 
are plausibly “public” phenomenon that constrain private behavior. So too is the 
bankruptcy system.   
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Mnookin and Kornhauser described perhaps the most obvious way the 
public intervenes to manage the risk of contracts: by setting the boundaries of 
acceptable private ordering through laws and regulations. 
Through public law, the government prescribes the allowable subject-
matter for private bargains. For example, parties cannot strike a deal to kill for 
hire,55 they cannot contract for the sale and distribution of illegal substances,56 
and they cannot agree to buy and sell human organs.57 There are also less 
striking examples: parties cannot contract to fix prices,58 landlords cannot make 
tenants pay liquidated damages in many states, 59  employers cannot ask 
employees to agree to non-competition clauses with long durations,60 and many 
retailers cannot sell alcohol to residents of the states of Utah or Pennsylvania.61 
In addition to setting guardrails, ex ante, for what private parties can 
bargain for, the government can also intervene through regulation. Fleischer 
describes this process best. Regulation, which changes frequently and which 
may be inconsistently enforced even when static, forces private parties to 
consider and continue to renegotiate with regulators as they shape their deals.62 
Antitrust review of major corporate deals provides an apt example of 
regulators’ role in negotiating private deals. Before a large deal in the United 
States can close, the parties need to seek and obtain approval from antitrust 
authorities.63 This process is overseen by the Federal Trade Commission or the 
Department of Justice and gives the relevant regulator a seat squarely at the 
table. For example, not only do the parties have to provide relevant information 
55 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (2004).   
56 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018).  
57 Kimberly D. Krawiec, Wenhao Liu, & Marc L. Melcher, Contract Development in 
a Matching Market: The Case of Kidney Exchange, 80 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 11, 14 (2017). 
58  UNITED STATES FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, Price Fixing, available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/competition-guidance/guide-antitrust-
laws/dealings-competitors/price-fixing (describing price-fixing as “almost always 
illegal). 
59  TENANT RESOURCE CENTER, Fees and Liquidated Damages (Jul. 19, 2018), 
available at https://www.tenantresourcecenter.org/liquidated_damages. 
60 Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285 (Cal. 2008); Stryker Sales Corp. 
v. Zimmer Boimet, Inc., 231 F. Supp. 3d 606 (E.D. Cal. 2017).
61 A miserable fate for both authors, who, at the time of this writing, were residents 
of Utah and Pennsylvania. 47 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4-491-99 (West 2017); UTAH CODE 
ANN. §32B-4-401-24 (West 1953).  
62 Fleischer, supra note 10, at 238–39. 
63 Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Announces Annual Update of Size of Transaction Thresholds 
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to regulators about the deal so that regulators can determine the deal’s impact 
on the market, but also regulators can request additional information through 
the costly and time-consuming “second request” process. Once regulators have 
reviewed the deal, they can also engage in a negotiation process with the parties. 
For instance, in the 2010 merger between travel behemoths United Airlines 
and Continental Airlines, the deal parties engaged in just such a back-and-forth 
with regulators.64 Among the Department of Justice’s concerns was the fact 
that, post-merger, there would be little competition in flights between 
Continental’s hub in Newark and existing United hubs. Moreover, because the 
Newark airport has a limited number of “slots” for takeoff and landing—and 
many were held by Continental—it would be nearly impossible for another 
carrier to gain a foothold in the Newark markets. After much negotiation, the 
parties—United, Continental, and the Department of Justice—agreed that 
Continental would lease thirty-six of its slots at the Newark airport to low-cost 
carrier Southwest Airlines, which would then begin to offer service from 
Newark, thereby alleviating monopoly concerns.  
Antitrust regulators are also far from the only ones that have a role in 
corporate acquisitions. A slew of authorities, from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to the Environmental Protection Agency to a joint committee on 
national security, can play a role in deal-making, causing parties to restructure 
their deals with regulators in mind or to renegotiate their deals with regulators 
directly. In fact, regulators are so important that private parties often write 
contracts using magic words that they know regulators prefer—in other words, 
writing contracts with regulators in mind as an audience, rather than each other 
or the courts.65 The result is often one contract trying to speak to too many 
audiences at once—the parties themselves, courts, and regulators.  
Finally, government also intervenes in contracts through courts. This is the 
intervention that Bagchi and others explicitly contemplate (and celebrate). In 
her article, Bagchi suggests that, should courts have a chance to interpret 
contracts, they ought to consider the impact of the contract on the legally-
protected interests of third parties.66 And while Bagchi’s argument certainly 
makes sense—courts certainly could consider those interests more explicitly—
courts also already consider the interests of third parties, and not just third 
64 Chris Davis, U.S. OKs Continental, United Merger, Southwest To Take Newark Slots, 
BUSINESS TRAVEL NEWS (Aug. 27, 2010), 
https://www.businesstravelnews.com/2010/US-OKs-Continental-United-Merger-
Southwest-To-Take-Newark-Slots/13945. 
65 Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 10. 
66 Bagchi, supra note 34. 
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parties with legally-protected interests. Instead, courts protect the interest of a 
broader swath of third parties—the general public.  
For example, in the city of Berkeley, California, residential rentals for less 
than a 30-day period are subject to a special 12% tax, which the landlord is 
supposed to collect.67 This local ordinance is an ex ante boundary, as described 
by Mnookin and Kornhauser. However, the ordinance cannot physically 
prohibit landlords and tenants from entering into short-term leases that do not 
contemplate the special tax. Instead, if there is a dispute about the lease, and 
the matter goes before a judge, the judge, standing in for the public, has another 
opportunity to vindicate the public’s interests—perhaps by invalidating the 
contract or by reforming it so that the 12% tax is included.  
Through contract interpretation and enforcement in courts, the general 
public always has the last say in a contract.68 And this final intervention by the 
public is expansive. For example, when a contract covers illegal subject matter, 
the court is likely to invalidate it—thereby vindicating the preferences of the 
public, as expressed through law. And although the court does not specifically, 
as Bagchi would urge, consider the rights of third parties, the public’s interests 
are always the backdrop against with the court makes decisions.  
One of the most important ways for courts to have the final say is through 
contract interpretation. Ordinarily, contract interpretation allocates burdens in 
contracts where the parties have resolved to be rid of one another. Sometimes, 
however, parties in ongoing relationships seek court intervention to settle the 
meaning of a contract with ongoing performance obligation. Courts in such 
cases may turn to reformation.69 
Reformation is an equitable remedy that applies most commonly in cases 
of mistake or fraud.70 In those cases, courts might “transpose, reject, or supply 
words” to make the contract more closely align with what it believes to be the 
parties’ true intent.71 The idea of reformation is to adjust the contract, so that 
67 Berkeley Mun. Code § 7.36.030 (2020). 
68 Our bankruptcy friends think their word is last, of course, and indeed 
bankruptcy and its shadow does play an important role in the end of certain classes of 
contracting. See generally Jonathan C. Lipson, The Secret Life of Priority: Corporate 
Reorganization After Jevic, 93 Wash. L. Rev. 631, 657 (2018) (arguing for the hybrid 
public-private nature of the bankruptcy system). 
69 Loosely, scholars speak of reformation whenever the contract’s meaning is 
readjusted in ways beyond ordinary processes of interpretation. But it is clearer to 
distinguish between deals that do, and do not, contemplate future performance.  
70 Richard A. Lord, 27 Williston on Contracts § 70:25 (4th ed. 2020); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 155 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).  
71 JOHN E. MURRAY, JR. & TIMOTHY MURRAY, 1 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS DESK 
EDITION § 70:20 (2019). 
 
The Social  Cost  o f  Contract  17 
the written agreement can better align with the substantive (“real”) mutual 
understanding of the contracting parties.72  
To be clear, reformation has long been the black sheep of contract 
interpretation, and has always been susceptible to powerful critiques sounding 
in predictability, legitimacy, and court competency. 73  Leading treatises call 
reformation an “extraordinary equitable remedy” that “should be granted with 
great caution,”74 note that it should not be used to fix immaterial mistakes,75 
and speak sternly of the need to prove several onerous elements with clear and 
convincing evidence before a court can reform a contract.76 
In part, reformation has a bad reputation because the straightforward, 
textual enforcement of a contract has long been regarded as a feature, rather 
than a bug, of American law. Contracting parties can enter into deals with the 
full confidence that, except in a few narrow circumstances, American courts 
will interpret them as written, rather than trying to change the contract after 
the fact to meet other goals. Indeed, scholars have long argued that parties—
especially sophisticated ones—know what they are putting into a contract, and 
that any odd-seeming omissions are the result of considered and thoughtful 
drafting.77 
But although reformation embarrasses jurists, courts have reformed 
contracts repeatedly in the modern era. For example, courts have readily 
reformed contracts where there was mutual mistake.78 In addition to individual 
72 Id. at § 70:19. 
73 See, e.g., Robert Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: An Analysis 
Under Modern Contract Law, 1987 DUKE L.J. 1. Hillman provides the best modern 
defense of reformation in long-term relationships, although he would confine 
reformation to adjustment of duration instead of terms. 
74 Lord, supra, note 70 at § 70:25. 
75 Id. at § 70:31. 
76 Id. at § 70:25. 
77 See Robert E. Scott & George Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 
115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006) (arguing that vague provisions in contracts are the result of 
parties’ decision not to expend the upfront cost to draft specific provisions, because 
that provision is unlikely to be the subject of a costly litigation); Robert E. Scott & 
George Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract Design, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010) (arguing 
the same in the context of material adverse change clauses in mergers and acquisitions). 
78 Jensen v. Miller, 570 P.2d 375 (Or. 1977) (reforming a contract where both 
parties were mistaken about the location of a land boundary); Twin Forks Ranch, Inc. 
v. Brooks, 964 P.2d 838 (N.M. App. Ct. 1998) (reforming a contract where parties 
failed to convey water taps that both parties agreed were supposed to be conveyed); 
Mathis v. Wendling, 962 P.2d 160 (Wyo. 1998) (reforming a contract where a 
mathematical mistake led to one party not fully paying a debt to another). See also 
Providence Square Ass’n, Inc. v. Biancardi, 507 So.2d 1366 (Fla. 1987) (reforming a
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reformations, courts have also engaged in large-scale reformation of contracts, 
typically in litigations that follow systemic crises. After both the post-2008 
Great Recession and during 1920s hyperinflation, for example, even usually 
formalist courts were willing to reform contracts where the parties’ 
fundamental agreement had been eroded by a sudden turn of events. 79 
Moreover, Delaware state courts, easily the most influential court for business 
contract disputes, has long decided cases using equitable principles that amount 
to reformation.80 
It is worth noting that ex ante boundary-setting, regulatory intervention, 
and the court’s role as a final checkpoint are not the only way that the public 
interacts with contracts. But they are three common ways that the public 
interacts with contracts, and they all illustrate the same point: that private-party 
contracting inflicts negative externalities upon the public, and the public, 
through these various mechanisms, has a way to keep those externalities in 
check.  
Each of these government-intervention measures comes attended by a 
mixture of costs and benefits. Boundary-setting can be both over- and under-
inclusive. Borderline cases can blur the lines on what is allowable or not, and—
perhaps more troublingly—clear demarcations of legality allow clever 
contracting parties to engage in arbitrage and gamesmanship. 81  Regulatory 
intervention introduces considerable uncertainty to contracts, slows down the 
pace of deals, and can impede bargaining and economic growth. It also 
sometimes leads parties to insert excessive boilerplate language that they know 
will pass regulatory scrutiny, rendering the text of contracts to be so inflated as 
contract that allocated equal ownership shares to units in a condominium when a 
developer and owners understood that the percentage would vary with the size of the 
units); Trip-Tenn, Inc. v. Schultz, 656 N.W.2d 747 (S.D. 2003) (reforming a contract 
that contained incorrect amortization calculations). 
79 Emily Strauss, Crisis Construction in Contract Boilerplate, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
163 (2019) (arguing that courts often engage in “crisis construction” to interpret 
contracts in a way that is directly at odds with its plain language); John Dawson, Judicial 
Revision of Frustrated Contracts: Germany, 63 B. U. L. REV. 1039 (1983) (same). Indeed, as 
one scholar has recently explored, reformation of contractual agreements is common 
in even extremely sophisticated markets where the need for stability would seem to be 
preeminent. See generally Julia Arato, The Private Law Critique of International Investment 
Law, 113 A.J.I.L. 1 (2019). 
80 See, e.g., Haley v. Talcott, 864 A. 2d 86 (Del. Ch. 2004) (permitting dissolution 
using statute instead of contractually required exit mechanism “because [the contract] 
does not equitably effect the separation of the parties.”) 
81 See, e.g., Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration, 80 BROOK. L. REV. 852 
(2015) (describing how U.S-based companies use mergers to thwart federal tax laws 
that otherwise prohibit them from reincorporating in lower-tax jurisdictions).  
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to be meaningless.82 And ex-post policing of contract terms via litigation is 
horribly expensive and inefficient, difficult to predict given the many variables 
at play, and subject to gamesmanship as parties choose the place and law that 
govern their deals.   
These challenges give rise to a familiar problem of institutional choice: 
when is it best to use which method of mitigating risky contracts?83 Generally 
speaking, ex ante governance dominates over ex post methods, for all of the 
obvious reasons of efficiency and predictability.  But our focus in this Essay is 
on a set of contracts that appear benign when they are formed and 
consequently escape boundary-setting and regulatory guardians. When risks 
increase sharply post-formation, policing through court decisions, in a sense 
the least appealing and effective constraint on risk-taking, is the least bad option 
available.   
We focus in the next section on these emergently risky deals, which, having 
escaped the usual guardrails, land before courts in unusual circumstances.   
II. PUBLIC HEALTH AND THE ANTI-CANON
The public generally allows contracts to be performed when they entail a 
tolerable amount of social risk. Routine enforcement of deals makes up the 
canon of contract law, and it is vigorously supported by scholars and 
practitioners alike.84 But what happens when the public’s burden increases 
exponentially between the contract’s signing and its performance?  
We argue that courts, standing in for the public, have a chance to reform 
contracts when the public’s burden changes materially and unexpectedly. 
Courts can reform contracts by excusing performance, interpreting broad 
carve-outs, and changing contractual burdens to discourage performance.85   
82 Hwang & Jenenjohn, Contractual Depth, supra note 10 (discussing how parties 
insert boilerplate into contracts to meet regulators’ requirements, rather than because 
the parties themselves want them).  
83  See, e.g., NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING 
INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994); Benjamin H. 
Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should Control Lawyer 
Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L. REV. 1167, 1231–46 (2003); 
Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and the Microanalysis of 
Institutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1424–33 (1996). 
84 Cf. J.M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, The Canons of Constitutional Law, 111 HARV. 
L. REV.. 963, 1018–19 (1998).
85 Already commentators urge courts to consider systemic consequences (to the
insurance system, to the economy, etc.) in deciding the meaning of insurance contracts. 
It would seem no great step to further pull in health effects in interpreting terms (just 
as courts have long considered other social policies in interpretation, like making 
markets more settled). Contractual interpretation is, of course, highly contingent and 
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This Part discusses performance and interpretation in the context of 
contracts that, when performed, produce outsized public burden. We leave the 
discussion of remedies to Part III.  
The analysis here is particularly salient in the current time, when the Covid-
19 pandemic has made performing many contracts a public health hazard. 
Weddings, funerals, and corporate conferences have become super-spreader 
events—but groups can come under pressure to hold them so as not to lose 
valuable non-refundable venue deposits.86 In the next cycles of the virus, more 
parties will enter into like contracts, now forewarned about the possibility of 
pandemic, but still not fully appreciating the social costs of performance. 
Indeed, for all of the reasons that motivate most tort scholarship, parties 
will discount externalities in making their private choices. But these risks matter 
to courts, which have, in the past, reformed contract terms to avoid enforcing 
contracts that, if performed, would cause outsized public harms. 87  
What we describe here is an anti-canon: a set of disfavored and odd cases 
that result from extraordinary facts. Although these anti-canon cases are bad 
guides for ordinary contract dispositions, they are still nominally good law. 
Together, they suggest how public health might matter to contract 
enforcement—and how we might expect courts, in the wake of the current 
factually dependent, and even a few decisions interpreting key clauses might have large 
effects. John F. Coyle, Interpreting Forum Selection Clauses, 104 IOWA L. REV. 1791, 1797 
n.17 (2019) (“To speak of the ‘butterfly effect’ in boilerplate contract interpretation . . 
. is to describe the effect that a single interpretive decision can have on the interests of 
far-flung parties not involved in the litigation at hand.”).
86 See Prof. Caprice Roberts’ description of negotiations around the cancelling of 
a recent law conference, which explained why the conference sought to keep 
registration fees: “SEALS is offering full refunds with extended deadline. Hotel 
pressed attrition clause; negotiating still. Community wants all workshops to remain 
intact for broader audience participation by any who want go online. SEALS made a 
good-faith determination to ensure some recoupment” available at 
https://twitter.com/capricelroberts/status/1269328516920868865 (last visited June 
23, 2020).  
87 Cf. Robert S. Summers, Two Types of Substantive Reasons: The Core of a Theory of 
Common-Law Justification, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 717 (1978) (listing “public health” 
as a reason to make common law decision, but without specific application to 
contracts); Leon E Trakman, Public Responsibilities Beyond Consent: Rethinking Contract 
Theory, 45 HOFSTRA L. REV. 217, 217 (2016); Margaret Rosso Grossman & Gregg A. 
Scoggins, The Legal Implications of Covenants Not To Compete in Veterinary Contracts, 71 
NEB. L. REV. 826, 845 (1992) (arguing that considerations of public health should 
inform enforcement of non-competes in veterinary contracts). 
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pandemic, to interpret contracts that have the potential to endanger public 
health.88  
A. Performance
Courts have sometimes excused contract performance when it poses public
hazards. And, although these cases are few, they provide an important example 
of how contract and health risks have interacted in the past—and perhaps 
provide a roadmap for how courts can excuse performance in the current 
climate. 
A visceral example comes from the nondisclosure context, in the case of 
Giannecchini v. Hospital of St. Raphael.89  In the case, a nurse was fired for serious 
errors. The hospital agreed not to disclose the fact of his involuntary 
termination to any new employer, but later disclosed the underlying facts when 
a new employer called for a reference check.90  
The nurse sued for breach, arguing that nondisclosure clauses are ordinarily 
enforceable. But the court had concerns. While performance 
“[m]ay be advantageous to the parties to the contract . . . the contract 
affects a third interest unrepresented at the bargaining table. That 
interest is the interest of the patient . . . . If contractual provisions 
like this are judicially enforceable, some of the most vulnerable 
citizens in our society—patients in hospitals—will inevitably be 
exposed to a risk of physical harm.”91 
Although the court ultimately upheld the contract, it did so “unhappily,” 
noting that its upholding was because of the legislatively-provided privacy right 
in employment records.92 
88 In constitutional law, the anti-canon was described by Green as those cases 
which “embod[y] a set of propositions that all legitimate constitutional decisions must 
be prepared to refute.” Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380 
(2011). Green focuses on wrongness in his definition. We, though borrowing the term, 
would rather focus on a set of cases which run counter to the normal trend, and which 
(though not necessarily wrong in their eras) are bad law in good times. See also Mary 
Anne Case, “The Very Stereotype the Law Condemns”: Constitutional Sex Discrimination Law 
as a Quest for Perfect Proxies, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1447, 1469 n.112 (2000) (“anti-
precedents”). 
89 Giannecchini v. Hospital of St. Raphael, 780 A.2d. 1006 (Conn. Super. 2000). 
90  Giannecchini, and like nondisclosure cases, are explored in Hoffman & 
Lampmann, supra note 39, at 192–95. 
91 Id. at 1008. 
92 Id. at 1010–11. 
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Bowman v. Parma Board of Education was a similar case.93 In Bowman, a teacher 
molested his charges, but his settlement with the school district included a 
confidentiality clause.94 Later, a member of the school board called the teacher’s 
new employer and disclosed the teacher’s past.95 
After his death, the teacher’s estate sued for violation of the confidentiality 
agreement. Noting that the teacher was “entirely unsuited for the teacher 
profession,” the court went on to hold: 
The only possible conclusion . . . is that the non-disclosure clause is 
void and unenforceable and no cause of action will lie for its breach. 
. . . The court will not countenance an action for breach of such a 
clause . . . , for to do so would be to expose our most vulnerable 
citizens to a completely unacceptable risk of physical, mental and 
emotional harm.96 
There are other like cases. In Living Rivers Council v. City of St. Helena,97 the 
court denied enforcement of a contract that would have slowed the mitigation 
of the potential flooding of a local town. It wrote: 
Where a promisor reasonably apprehends impossibility or serious danger 
to life or health of third persons, the promisor may be excused from 
commencing performance, and in some situations may be wholly 
discharged from the obligation to perform.98 
Similarly, in Northern Corp. v. Chugach Elec. Ass'n, a contractor walked away 
from a job hauling rocks across an iced-over lake after two drivers fell through 
the ice and died. When the contractor was sued for breach, the court noted that 
in light of the risks to life and limb, performance was impracticable.99 
As Corbin points out, Hanford, the baby-fair case, can also be read as a case 
that forbids contracts that create a public nuisance. 100  The Association’s 
performance was neither strictly speaking impractical nor frustrated.101 Rather, 
93 Bowman v. Parma Bd. of Educ., 542 N.E.2d 663 (Ohio Ct. App. 1988). 
94 Id. at 664–66. 
95 Bafflingly, the second district continued to employ the teacher. The teacher 
continued his criminal behavior and was eventually investigated again, resigned, and 
entered into another settlement agreement. Id. at 666. 
96 Id. at 666–67. 
97 2007 Ca App. Ct. Briefs Lexis 5413 (Ct. of App. CA 2007) 
98 Id. (citing Spangenberg v. Spangenberg, 126 P. 379 (Cal. Ct. App. 1912)). 
99 518 P.2d 76. 
100 14 Corbin on Contracts § 75.3. 
101 That said, the Restatement on Contracts 454, Explanatory Notes (Mar. 28, 
1932), does state that the impracticability rule proposed had Hanford partially in mind. 
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it was against the public’s weal to perform, and, as such, there was no breach 
to forgive. 
The fact that there are relatively few cases in this line is, itself, noteworthy. 
Covid-19 is not the first viral epidemic in the country’s history, let alone in the 
storied past of the common law. One reason might be that, as in many 
situations, contracting parties simply hashed out their differences privately, 
rather than sue in court.102 In the context of an epidemic, many contracting 
parties may also have given up their contractual rights if enforcing them would 
cause death and destruction—perhaps because they were not literal comic-
book villains bent on world destruction. They might also have believed that 
courts would not allow them to enforce their rights.  
But we might also see so few cases like Hanford because courts sometimes 
do enforce contracts that do create public hazards.103  In one old case, for 
example, a contractor refused to build a grandstand when he believed, with 
good reason, that it would harm anyone who sat on it.  But the court found 
that fear for the public was not a valid excuse to performance—and an 
engineer’s statement that the building was a death trap was consequently 
inadmissible!104 
Or consider Judge Beach’s pithy dissent in Hanford. Beach denied that 
private parties could vindicate public health interests, or at least that juries 
should sanction (through rough justice) self-help as an exercise of a private 
contracting regime, writing: 
I dissent from the broad proposition that whenever an otherwise 
lawful act becomes dangerous to the public health, it automatically 
becomes contrary to public policy and therefore unlawful, without 
any statute or order intervening to make it so. 
Proposed Final Draft No. 11; reprinted in A.L.I. ARCHIVES PUBLICATIONS IN 
MICROFICHE, microfiche 1130, at 189-91 (1985). 
102 Cathy Hwang, Deal Momentum, 65 UCLA L. REV. 376, 423 (2018) (noting that 
many contracts cases are not litigated to opinion).  
103 Kohn v. Geist, 168 N.Y.S. 21, 22 (N.Y. Sup. App. Term 1918) (where plaintiff 
had let out a boarding house and polio broke out, “It was not seriously urged on the 
trial that the fact that there had developed in the house an infectious or contagious 
disease constituted a defense to plaintiff's demand.”) 
104 N.J. Magnum Co. v. Fuller, 222 Mass. 530 (1916) (holding that contractor who 
refused to build a grandstand that if completed would be risky for the public could not 
use that risk as an excuse); see also Kohn v. Geist, 168 N.Y.S. 21 (N.Y.Sup. 1918) 
(Where plaintif had let out a  boarding house and polio broke out, “It was not seriously 
urged on the trial that the fact that there had developed in the house an infectious or 
contagious disease constituted a defense to plaintiff's demand.”) 
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. . . It is our public policy, I think, that a determination of the 
preliminary question whether the public health is endangered, should 
be left to the responsible medical  experts appointed for that 
purpose, and not to the judicium rusticum of a jury; also that these 
official experts should determine in advance what, if any, preventive 
measures ought to be taken, instead of leaving that question to be 
determined, after the event, by a jury.105 
Judge Beach’s dissent represents the normal contract law of public policy, 
which is normally closely aligned to legislative or regulatory rules which 
demonstrate the ill-repute of a contract’s subject. 106  In the context of the 
pandemic, courts adjudicating contractual disputes may have many executive 
orders (not to mention legislative acts) from which to infer that the contract’s 
subject harmed the public’s health. But they may not, and it’s not obvious that 
courts are always willing to wait for the sanction of other branches of 
government before declaring contracts to be hazardous. 
This tension in the cases between purely litigation-based policing of 
externalities and ones sounding in public policy recurs in the context of 
interpretation. 
B. Interpretation
Another way for courts to intervene is by interpreting existing contract
provisions broadly. For example, contracts both big and small often have a 
“force majeure” clause, excusing performance in the event of certain 
unforeseen catastrophes—and although pandemic coronaviruses are rarely 
specified within those clauses,107 it would not be out of the realm of possibility 
for courts to consider a pandemic a force majeure. To the extent that such 
105 Hanford v. Conn. Fair Ass'n, 103 A. 838, 839 (Conn. 1918). 
106 David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39 FL. ST. 
UNIV. L. REV. 563 (2012) (showing that many public policy opinions focus on 
legislative or regulatory prohibitions). 
107 A common variant is “pandemic flu.”  See, e.g., the University of Vermont’s 
clause: “In the event that the University of Vermont closes due to a calamity or 
catastrophe beyond its control that would make continued operation of student 
housing infeasible, such as a natural disaster, a national security threat, or widespread 
pandemic flu, room and meal plan fees will not be refunded.” UNIV. OF VT. DEPT. OF 
RESIDENTIAL LIFE, Housing and Meal Plan Contract Terms & Conditions 2019–2020, 
https://reslife.uvm.edu/files/2019-2020_reslife_contract.pdf.  The coronavirus is not 
an influenza virus: it is not, as we all know, the flu.  But only hyper-literal courts would 
fail to excuse obligation on this ground. 
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clauses expand beyond ordinary impracticability doctrine (which is at best 
unclear) 108 courts might avoid textualist readings to excuse breach. 
In reality, however, courts rarely discuss public health as an explicit factor 
in interpretation disputes,109 and past epidemics offer only a murky guide for 
how courts will interpret contract clauses during a public health crisis.110  
In the 1800s and early 1900s, for instance, epidemics caused numerous local 
school closures. Teachers, locked out of their workplaces, sued for salaries for 
periods when their schools were closed.111 These cases usually focused on one 
of two questions: If there was no specific contract provision, did schools have 
to pay salaries when closed? And, if there was a provision requiring payment 
regardless of disease, would the school have to pay it? 
In some cases, when schools closed due to public health orders, courts 
found performance impossible and consequently held that the teachers were 
owed nothing.112 One way to think about the courts’ reasoning in these cases is 
through the parlance of externalities borne by the public: if schools stayed open 
in defiance of health orders during an epidemic, they would be performing their 
contracts with their employees, but increasing the harm to the public to 
unacceptable levels. 
But in many cases, when schools were more proactive about reducing 
harms to the public, courts still found them on the hook for teacher salaries.  
108 Gideon Parchomovsky, Peter Siegelman, & Steve Thiel, Of Equal Wrongs and 
Half Rights, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 738, 786 (2007) (finding, based on sample of clauses, 
that they do not).  
109 For an analogous example, consider the promissory estoppel cases where they 
shade meaning of promises to create enforceable obligations. Ypsilanti Twp. v. Gen. 
Motors Corp., 506 N.W.2d 556 (Mich. App. 1993). One notable example is Cutter v. 
Hamlen, 18 N.E. 397, 399 (Mass. 1888) (finding on the basis of “some evidence that 
the plaintiff was misled by specific statements as to the condition of the drainage” that 
death resulting from diphtheria disease following sale of a house was actionable though 
a plain language reading of the contract would seem to have prevented recovery). 
110 Williston on Contracts (4th) 77:107 (“In several cases where schools have been 
closed due to epidemics, teachers have recovered without considering the probable 
duration of the closing or whether the teacher was bound or required to remain ready 
to resume work. Teachers generally work on a school-year contract basis; once the 
school year has begun, if a school house burns down, a displaced teacher is hard 
pressed to find an alternate teaching assignment. Yet, other decisions have denied 
recovery absent a requirement to stand by ready to teach, where the impracticability 
of performance is prolonged.”) 
111 For scholarly treatments of these cases, see Town Hall, Rights of a Teacher in the 
Public Schools When School is Closed, 25 KY. L. J. 261 (1937). 
112 See, e.g., Sch. Dist. No. 16 of Sherman Cty. v. Howard, 98 N.W. 666 (Neb. 
1904). 
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In cases where there were no provisions denying the right of payment,113 
courts often reasoned that the schools were better risk bearers.114 An oft-cited 
case is Dewey v. Union School District, which held that “the closing of the schools 
was a wise and timely expedient; but the defense interposed cannot rest on that. 
It must appear that observance of the contract by the district was caused to be 
impossible by act of God. It is not enough that great difficulties were encountered 
(emphasis added).”115 In the 1889 case of Goodyear v. Sch. Dist. No. 5,116 too, a 
teacher sought lost wages from a district that had closed due to a local health 
board’s order during a diphtheria epidemic. The court found that the school 
closure could not establish legal impossibility, “however prudent and necessary 
it may be.” More importantly, the court said, the district had an alternative 
available to them that would have enabled it to mitigate its loss by adding 
teaching days at the end of the school year. 
Courts often ignored even contract provisions that allowed schools not to 
pay salaries during closures. In Randolph v. Sanders,117  for instance, a Texas 
teacher held herself ready to perform during a smallpox epidemic. Her contract 
stated that she would only be paid at the end of each month and reserved the 
right for the city board to cancel the contract and close the school at any time. 
Nevertheless, when the school closed, the plaintiff was able to recover—the 
court stretched to interpret “the services” broadly to include holding oneself 
ready to perform.118 
If there is a common thread that runs through these cases, it is the court’s 
interest in finding equitable solutions. Whether the trigger for the school 
closure was the school’s choice or a public health official’s, and whether or not 
there was a contract provision speaking to the issue, courts appeared interested 
in protecting the weaker party—that is, individual teachers—from bearing the 
entire economic cost. And these pandemic courts were willing to reach to those 
solutions: suggesting (atextual) time-shifting solutions or reading clauses out of 
contracts that would have excused salary payments, for example. 
* *  *
113 See, e.g., Goodyear v. Sch. Dist. No. 5, 21 P. 664 (Or. 1889). 
114 Mc KAY v. BARNETT, 21 Utah 239; Bd. of Ed. of City of Hugo, Choctaw 
Cty. v. Couch, 1917 OK 42, 63 Okla. 65, 162 P. 485; Libby v. Douglas, 175 Mass. 128; 
Gregg School Tp. v. Hinshaw, 76 Ind. App. 503; Crane v. School Dist., 95 Ore. 644; 
Montgomery v. Board of Educ., 102 Ohio St. 189 (bus driver). 
115 Dewey v. Union School Dist., 5 N.W. 646 (Mich. 1880). 
116 17 Or. 517, 21 P. 664 (1889) 
117 54 S.W. 621 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899). 
118 Id. at 623. 
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Epidemic diseases are wildly disruptive and have tragically recurred in 
Anglo-American history.119 And yet courts appear to have only rarely discussed 
how to relate such events to contractual obligation. To be sure, excuse based 
on a party’s illness or fear of illness is common, and many law firm circulars 
cite the granddaddy of such cases, Lakeman v. Pollard, where the court forgave 
breach given the local prevalence of cholera.120 But the cases in this vein are 
few, and that is strange, given that both leading contract law treatises emphasize 
courts’ interest in sharing losses and protecting the public during times of 
epidemic risk.121 As we alluded earlier, it is unclear why there are so few cases 
explicitly discussing disease risks and contracting.  
In the next section, we discuss the consequence of this lack of caselaw and 
the dangers of being too certain about what comes next. 
III. ROUGH JUSTICE
Contract litigation generated during the Great Pause will persist long after 
a cure arrives. Thus far, this Essay has suggested that in this future mass of 
cases, judges are likely to at least consider how private contract performance 
affects public health risk. Covid-19, an unanticipated event that vastly increased 
the public harm of some contract performances, may spur courts to refuse to 
enforce, or reinterpret, contracts in ways the parties have not contemplated. 
Or not. The caselaw discussed here is sparse: at the most, parties seeking 
to enforce contracts that cause substantial public health harm might face 
skeptical receptions. Our prediction is far from bankable: many factors, 
including the proximity of the pandemic’s spread to the court decision, the 
parties’ relative fault, the actions and signaling by public health authorities, and 
the specificity of contract terms about risk, will influence courts’ dispositions 
of Covid-19 cases. Judges’ appetite for ignoring contractual language is highly 
contingent. 
119  For a useful bibliography, see 
https://environmentlawhistory.blogspot.com/p/legal-history-of-epidemics-
selected_20.html.   
120 Lakeman, supra: “The plaintiff was under no obligation to imperil his life by 
remaining at work in the vicinity of a prevailing epidemic so dangerous in its character 
that a man of ordinary care and prudence . . . would have been justified in leaving by 
reason of it . . . . The propriety of his conduct in leaving his work at that time must be 
determined by examining the state of facts as then existing.” 
121  See, e.g., Williston on Contracts (4th) § 13:12 (“Bargains which require a 
performance likely to jeopardize unreasonably the life or health of either or both 
parties, or of a third person, are illegal even though the party whose life or health is 
jeopardized has voluntarily assumed the risk.”); ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN & JOSEPH 
M. PERILLO, 14 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 77.7 (Rev. ed. 1993).
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This concluding Part seeks to suggest even more reasons to doubt that we 
can surely know how courts will adjudicate Covid-related cases. Many cases 
relating to pandemic-related contract breaches will be roughly hewn—bad facts 
making bad law. And, although reformation and other post hoc adjustments 
have been historically disfavored, its reemergence in the 2020s is highly possible 
and poses no existential threat to our scheme of ordered liberty. 
A. Expected areas of friction
Contract deposits will be a major point of contract contention in the
coming months and years. Many contracts require parties to pre-pay non-
refundable deposits or to agree to pay liquidated damages if an event is 
canceled. If a court excuses contract performance due to public health risk, 
what happens to prepaid deposits? Are deposits refundable? Should they be? 
Generally speaking, when a court excuses contract performance, parties 
may seek either reliance or restitution for pre-paid deposits.122 This rule applies 
even when deposits are explicitly said to be non-refundable, as it rests on the 
equitable rules of restitution.123 And yet cases applying such restitution rules are 
quite rare,124 and the decisions that exist are exceedingly hard to generalize 
from, difficult to predict, and routinely attacked ex post by efficiency-minded 
scholars.125 
Many have claimed that—contrary to the black letter rule—courts should 
honor non-refundable deposit clauses. 126  Such commitments motivate 
122 See U.C.C. §2-615  (noting that where "neither sense nor justice is served by 
either answer when the issue is posed in flat terms of 'excuse' or 'no excuse,'" courts 
should make appropriate adjustments); Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§272 (inviting courts to ignore stated rules when those rules "will not avoid injustice"); 
Parchomovsky et al., supra note 108, at 784 (arguing for equal division of windfalls and 
noting that force majeure language only rarely deals with allocation of losses and gains).
123 Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of Judicial Reconstruction of Contracts, 71 IND. L.J. 45, 
46 (1995). 
124 Goldberg, at 1166 (positing that there are few cites to the restatement because 
most parties have contracted around it). In one case, little discussed, a railway worker 
quit his job early because of the threats of violence in a strike.  The court held he could 
recover his quantum meruit, set off by the liquidated damages that the employer owed 
for the time he did not perform.  Fisher v. Walsh, 102 Wis. 172, 78 N.W. 437 (1899). 
125 For a smattering of approaches, see Andrew Kull, Mistake, Frustration and the 
Windfall Principle of Contract Remedies, 43 Hastings L. J. 1, 47 (1991) (contract doctrine 
should do nothing to avoid windfalls); Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: 
An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 292–
95 (1992) (restrictive application); Subha Narashimhan, Of Expectations, Incomplete 
Contracting, and the Bargain Principle, 74 Cal. L. Rev. 1123, 1130 (1986) (courts should 
divide unanticipated surplus). 
126 Goldberg, at 1146 (listing 7 reasons why parties make pre-paid deposits). 
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promisors to securely invest in performance in a world where post-breach 
litigation will (in the best case) return a fraction of its value. But these 
arguments do not fully consider the role of public externalities. True, courts 
rarely discuss public health concerns in their decisions about damages.127  But 
the absence of these types of discussions seems like an artifact of timing. Courts 
have only recently begun to discuss, explicitly, the relationship between 
externalities and legal doctrine, and Covid-19 is the first episode that might 
bring these deposit issues fully into the light. 
Courts considering contracts whose performance would increase public 
risks of disease might not permit one party to keep a deposit that tends to 
motivate socially-harmful performance. As professors, one example comes 
easily to us. Many colleges and universities across the country have announced 
that they plan to resume some kind of in-person instruction in the fall 2020 
semester. As a result, undergraduate and graduate students have paid non-
refundable seat deposits to secure a spot in the fall 2020 class—but might, if 
the pandemic worsens, find out shortly before the semester starts that classes 
will once again be online.  
An economist might read these non-refundable deposits as merely 
allocating the burden of risk. Students can spread losses (by, say, staying at 
home with their parents if they are lucky enough to have that option) and 
colleges cannot (because most are self-insured and can’t easily raise funds 
during a pandemic). Not requiring schools to refund deposits to students in the 
event of a last-minute switch to online classes might be socially optimal.  
But, of course, the fear of loss spurs behavior, and students are far from 
fully insured—many cannot stay with parents, have circumstances that prevent 
them from attending school online, and will be making serious sacrifices to 
afford those non-refundable deposits. Permitting universities to keep non-
refundable deposits will motivate students to push harder for in-person classes 
in an effort to recoup their losses.128 They will lobby administrators through 
127 Where courts to discuss public externalities, it is most commonly in cases about 
liquidated damages in doctors’ non-compete agreements. In these cases, it is not 
obvious that public health exceptions to contract performance are really applying to 
the damages calculus or the underlying restraint on movement. See Iredell Digestive 
Disease Clinic v. Petrozza, 373 S.E.2d 449 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988) (finding that a 
liquidated damages clause was not enforceable). 
128 Whether schools are required to provide in-person instruction rests on a variety 
of implied and explicit contracts, some of which have specific carve-outs stating that 
schools can move online in various special circumstances. The University of Vermont, 
for example, has a clause in its room and board contract providing that: “In the event 
that the University of Vermont closes due to a calamity or catastrophe beyond its 
control that would make continued operation of student housing infeasible, such as a 
natural disaster, a national security threat, or widespread pandemic flu, room and 
meal 
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direct action, shame faculty online for resisting teaching, and generally seek to 
avoid paying what their contracts state what they owe. In other words, 
nonrefundable deposit clauses in these circumstances make the underlying 
contracts more likely to be performed, even if performance is no longer in the 
public’s interest.  
Now, this calculus is slightly more complex that we are making it out, 
because if universities anticipate the rule we have proposed, and will know that 
they have to refund part of the deposits if they move to remote instruction, 
their behavior may shift. This will be motivated to avoid going online. Thus, at 
the margin, both enforcing contracts and disregarding them both seem to spiral 
toward a public health catastrophe. 
But we think that at equilibrium this pull will be weaker than the distributed 
push of consumer-side pressure.  After all,  universities are going to seek to go 
remote when they feel pressure to serve the public health, but particularly, when 
they receive calls from their liability insurers.  Those conversations will be direct 
and intense, and it is unlikely that universities will be able to resist them by 
pointing to the partial refunds they may have to make due to restitutionary 
principles we have discussed: the need to pay blood-money is an unattractive 
slogan for even the most cold blooded university administrator. 
Given this push-and-pull, courts may intervene and permit students to claw 
back some of their deposits in the form of restitution. Whether courts couch 
such decisions in language of externalities, or fault,129 fairness, or social policy, 
the temptation to award compromise remedies will be strong.  
Or consider another law-related example: the contract recent graduates 
make with their friendly State Board to allow them to sit for the Bar Exam.  In 
some States—such as, apparently, Oklahoma—the Board ordinarily required a 
fee that is nonrefundable if the candidate “did not sit.” In late June, 2020, 
graduating law students strategized how  to ensure that their temperatures did 
not exceed 100.4 degrees on the day of test administration.  Why?  Because if 
they ran a fever, under the rules they would be  denied entry and would not 
have “sat,” leaving them out of pocket the Exam fee. 130  This is a bad 
plan fees will not be refunded.” UNIV. OF VT. DEPT. OF RESIDENTIAL LIFE, Housing 
and Meal Plan Contract Terms & Conditions 2019–2020, 
https://reslife.uvm.edu/files/2019-2020_reslife_contract.pdf. Nonetheless, a class 
action lawsuit contended that because the University had not technically closed, the 
clause was not operative. Complaint at 6, Patel v. Univ. of Vt. & State Agric. Coll., No. 
2:20 Civ. 61 (D. Vt. Apr. 21, 2020). 
129 Fault in contract law is its secret vice. See Fault in American Contract Law, Volume 
107 MICH. L. REV. 2009. 
130 u/amorphousbutnotablob, Turned Away and Marked “Did Not Take,” REDDIT 
(Jun. 27, 2020), available at  https://www.reddit.com/r/Bar_Prep/comments/hgik77 
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equilibrium. If candidates could claw back the fee from the Bar, 
notwithstanding the contract that purported to make it non-refundable, we 
might see fewer diseased test-takers motivated to hide their symptoms, and 
thus better public health outcomes.  
   The practical takeaway, then, is this: parties to venue contracts, caterer 
contracts, and other contracts that involve non-refundable deposits should not 
behave as though those contracts are rock-solid. Rather, they should anticipate 
that there is a risk that a court will somehow reform, excuse or ignore non-
refundable deposits clauses, as they have in the past.   
B. The impact of forum
Questions of remedy are intertwined with ones of forum. Previous
pandemic cases played out in state and federal courts, but since then, there have 
been radical transformations in American dispute resolution. Two relatively 
novel features of the modern landscape—mass (but not class) arbitration and 
multidistrict litigation—make it particularly hard to predict the outcomes of 
individualized contract clauses. 
Many contract cases today are shunted to arbitration tribunals, which are 
famously prone to compromise and half-loaf solutions. While arbitral data is 
hard to come by, the conventional wisdom is that arbitrators prefer 
compromise to binary outcomes.131  In other words, arbitrators are already 
primed to split the baby during disputes, and in dealing with the special 
circumstance of Covid-related contract breach, they are even more likely to do 
so.132 
/turned_away_and_marked_did_not_take/ (Reddit user posts they fear they will be 
turned away from the bar exam if they have a low-grade fever and other Reddit users 
are noting how to keep one’s temperature low so they can allowed to sit for the exam. 
Originally posted by Twitter user Sonya Sadovaya at 
https://twitter.com/sonya_sadovaya/status/1277659151351656450, who has since 
removed her post).  
131 David Horton & Andrea Cann Chandrasekher, After the Revolution: An Empirical 
Study of Consumer Arbitration, 104 GEO. L.J. 57 (2015) (studying awards and finding a 
mixed set of results); Alexander J. S. Colvin, An Empirical Study of Employment 
Arbitration: Case Outcomes and Processes, 8 J. EMP. L. STUD. 1, 2 (2012) (repeat player 
effects); Klaus Peter Berger & J. Ole Jensen, The Arbitrator's Mandate to Facilitate 
Settlement, 40 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 887 (2017) (surveying practitioners and noting value 
of settlement promotion within arbitration). 
132 This assumes that consumer disputes will reach arbitrations instead of facing 
default judgments, which is not at all certain.  See Pamela Foohey, Dalié Jiménez, & 
Christopher K. Odinet, CARES Act Gimmicks How Not to Give People Money During a 
Pandemic and What to Do Instead, 2020 U. ILL. L. REV. ONLINE 81 (Apr. 22, 2020) (noting 
likelihood of default for car loans and foreclosures). 
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Arbitration is also unpredictable because it is private and parties face 
difficult in using past decisions to predict future outcomes.133 The predictability 
challenge is compounded by the fact that recent cases have made class 
arbitration more difficult, thereby creating a smorgasbord of individual cases 
that is even more impossible to find and summarize.134 Such cases, prosecuted 
at scale by technologically-aided consumer lawyers,135 are unlikely to produce 
single, definitive rulings.  
And state and federal courts, too, suffer from modern arbitrations’ mix of 
compromise and haze, even if that mix comes from a different source. In recent 
decades, Americans have increasingly sought clarity for incredibly complex 
social problems through litigation rather than through lawmaking.136 Issues as 
complex and wide-ranging as asbestos, 137  terrorism, 138  and the opioid 
epidemic139  have been dealt with in court, rather than legislatures.140  
133 Alyssa S. King, Arbitration and the Federal Balance, 94 Ind. L.J. 1447 (2019) 
(“With incomplete information from parties and arbitration providers, scholars, 
advocates, and politicians do not have a clear sense of how closely arbitrators follow 
the law.”). 
134 See generally Judith Resnik, Stephanie Garlock and Annie Wang, Collective 
Preclusion and Inaccessible Arbitration: Data, Non-Disclosure, and Public Knowledge, 24 LEWIS 
& CLARK L. REV. 365, 393-423(2020) (detailing difficulty in connecting data about 
individual outcomes in arbitration). 
135 Cf. https://myradvocate.com/ (internet based tool that allows consumers to 
pursue small claims in arbitration);  Abernathy v. DoorDash, 2020 WL 619785 (N.D. 
Cal. Feb. 10, 2020) (compelling arbitration on behalf of almost 6000 couriers. The 
Court concluded “DoorDash never expected that so many would actually seek 
arbitration. Instead, in irony upon irony, DoorDash now wishes to resort to a class-
wide lawsuit, the very device it denied to the workers, to avoid its duty to arbitrate. 
This hypocrisy will not be blessed, at least by this order”). 
136 Kathleen G. Noonan, Jonathan C. Lipson, William H. Simon, Reforming 
Institutions: The Judicial Function in Bankruptcy and Public Law Litigation, 94 Ind. L.J. 545 
(2019). 
137 Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that at the 
time, “[a]bout 5,000 asbestos-related cases are pending in this circuit”).   
138 Benjamin Weiser, Family and United Airlines Settle Last 9/11 Wrongful-Death 
Lawsuit, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2011), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/20/nyregion/last-911-wrongful-death-suit-is-
settled.html (describing the litigations that occurred after 9/11, involving such issues 
as United Airlines’ role in predicting the terrorist attack).   
139  In re Nat'l Prescription Opiate Litig., Case No. 1:17-MD-2804 (N.D. Ohio 
Sep. 26, 2019).  
140 See, e.g., Charlotte Garden, Union Made: Labor’s Litigation for Social Change, 88 
TULANE L. REV.  193 (2013) (describing how labor unions use Supreme Court 
litigation to lobby for change); Beth van Schaak, With All Deliberate Speed: Civil Human 
Rights Litigation as a Tool for Social Change, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2305 (2004) (discussing 
the 
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When courts (and litigators) devise solutions in these mass claims, they only 
rarely focus on individualized legal merits. Rather, the parties and the courts are 
trying to reach solutions that seem fair and equitable across the board. Judges 
act like the managers of enormous pools of settlement money, which are 
divided using formulas that are rarely, if ever, the result of pre-existing doctrinal 
rules. 141  These actions, sometimes organized formally through multidistrict 
litigation (MDL) proceedings, 142  and sometimes less formally through 
individualized ad hoc judging,143 have already come for Covid-19 cases. As the 
law firm Covington wrote of attempts to create a national Covid-insurance 
MDL: 
MDL proceedings often settle globally. Resolution of an MDL 
involving, for example, 100,000 different insurance claims might not 
result in any meaningful settlement payment for each claimant. Plus, 
in a global settlement, policyholders with better insurance policy 
language, better facts, or better documented claims may receive no 
more than policyholders with far weaker claims.144 
That courts have turned to MDL and like tribunals to adjudicate complex 
social phenomena is no accident, though it represents a new turn for MDLs, 
which have historically focused on tort, not contract. 145  It results from a 
impact for Alien Tort Statute-style litigation on, among other things, the human rights 
movements and other areas of social change).  
141 Andrew D. Bradt, The Long Arm of Multidistrict Litigation, 59 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 1165, 1224 (2018) (“In most large MDLs, what actually happens is that a 
settlement agreement is eventually negotiated by the lead lawyers, and it is likely to be 
one that leaves the plaintiff little practical choice but to accept.”); David L. Noll, MDL 
As Public Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 403, 420 (2019) (“The aggregate 
settlements that many MDLs culminate in are another site of procedural innovation. 
The prototypical settlement resolves all the cases collected before a transferee judge 
by establishing a special-purpose claims facility to process claims according to 
streamlined procedures negotiated by the defendant and plaintiff's leadership. These 
claims facilities are their own ad hoc institutions.”) 
142 For a trenchant recent critique of the MDL governance deficit, see David Noll, 
MDL as Public Administration, 118 MICH. L. REV. 403 (2019).  
143 Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U L. REV 767 
(2017). 
144 See Covington, Policyholders Beware: The Risks of Multi-District and Class 
Action Treatment of COVID-19 Insurance Claims (critiquing recent attempts to 
establish an insurance MDL), available at https://www.cov.com/-
/media/files/corporate/publications/2020/05/policyholders-beware-the-risks-of-
multidistrict-and-class-action-treatment-of-covid-19-insurance-claims.pdf.    
145 See United States Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation Calendar Year 
Statistics 2019, available at https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/ 
JPML_Calendar_Year_Statistics-2019_1.pdf (showing that only 2.1% of 2019 MDLs 
considered contract cases). 
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governance failure at the state and federal level to offer regulated solutions to 
complex social problems. But the result is still one where the millions of parties 
to future Covid-19 lawsuits—tenants, consumers, commercial insurers—are 
likely to be grouped together in mass adjudications, with little chance to have a 
judge make individualized findings about particular contracts.146 
Even college and graduate students who pay seat deposits can expect to 
have their claims heard in bulk and to have relief granted based not on close 
readings of individual contracts but rather through mass adjudication.147 One 
might expect, for instance, for a large university to agree to a bulk settlement 
with a class of disgruntled students and for a special master to divvy up the pot 
amongst students who are harmed in various ways. For students to plan based 
on reading their individual implicit or explicit contracts with the university—
about the dollars and cents they are entitled to receive in refund from the school 
gym, or dining hall plans, or tuition for portion of classes online, and many 
other details—would be folly. 
Put simply: Modern dispute resolution systems are not built to provide 
individualized adjudication for the breach of millions of contracts. Instead, 
even pre-Covid, courts and arbitral tribunals were already primed for 
compromise and reformation. Covid-19 and contract performance’s potential 
to amplify health risk only further tilts courts and arbitral tribunals toward 
compromise and reformation.  
This leads to some practical advice. Parties should be more willing to split 
the difference in Covid-19 contract cases than they would ordinarily be, 
regardless of the presence of contract clauses that purport to assign unilateral 
consequences for pandemic risks, provide for nonrefundable deposits, or 
disclaim impracticability and related defenses.148  
146 See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Unorthodox Civil Procedure: Modern Multidistrict 
Litigation's Place in the Textbook Understandings of Procedure, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1669, 1704 
(2017) (“federal judges acknowledged that state law issues can get ‘mushed’ together 
by the MDL's tendency to group similar cases together--cases that may include actions 
from states with closely related laws. But many judges insisted that they make efforts 
to apply the different state laws.”) 
147  See https://www.collegerefund2020.com/ (collecting plaintiffs); Anya 
Kamenetz, Colleges Face Student Lawsuits Seeking Refunds After Coronavirus Closures, 
Morning Edition, available at https://www.npr.org/2020/05/29/863804342/colleges-
face-student-lawsuits-seeking-refunds-after-coronavirus-closures (expressing 
skepticism about suits). 
148 One easy way to start down the path of compromise for complex deals is to 
negotiation a standstill agreement.  See Jonathan C. Lipson & Norman M. Powell, Don’t 
Just Do Something—Stand There! A Modest Proposal for a Model Standstill/Tolling Agreement, 
BUS. LAWYER TODAY (Apr. 14, 2020). 
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This counsel is needed on two fronts. 
First, we worry that lawyers are insufficiently attentive to contract’s anti-
canon. These cases exist and are good law, and yet they are often subsumed 
into doctrines of impracticability, duress, and frustration.  Unlike those 
defenses, public policy analysis cannot be easily defeated by showing that a 
party knew what it was getting into, assumed the risks by contract,  or was 
somehow otherwise at fault. The sort of analysis called on is therefore 
profoundly aberrant and will same strange for many modern readers. 
Hanford is the paradigmatic case—although it was featured in the First 
Restatement, it is all but forgotten. None of the law firm guidance we’ve seen 
in the last few months has even mentioned it as a possible outcome for a 
pandemic contract dispute. Lawyers have good reasons, of course, for citing to 
modern cases. Usually they are the best source for predictive judgment. But, as 
we’ve shown, the contract law has been occasionally quite attentive to risky 
contracts, and welcoming of reformation.  
Second, contract law, like politics, is downstream from culture. For much 
of the spring of 2020, epidemiologists and public health officials 
overwhelmingly agreed that large gatherings unacceptably increased public 
health risk. It would be incongruous for courts to interpret contracts to suggest 
that parties should have gathered large groups of people to perform their 
contracts despite public health recommendations. We worry that this kind of 
rift between contract law and social practice would cause individuals, in future 
pandemics, to ignore public health advice in anticipation of courts’ later 
responses. 
C. Reformation revisited
Finally, consider the problem of reformation of still-existing contractual
relationships. In a way, the problems we’ve discussed respecting contracts 
whose obligations have terminated recur in the context of contracts where the 
parties have long-term and continuing relations. Contracts ensuring the long-
term supply of goods and services, including insurance, may come before 
courts accompanied by claims that Covid-19 suggests the utility of atextual 
solutions. Courts will be asked to reform existing obligations, rather than 
reinterpret those that already came due. 
As discussed above, courts are often criticized when they reform 
continuing contracts, for requiring parties to perform a new deal, conceived 
and written in a judge’s chambers, is the least legitimate basis for contractual 
enforcement. Unlike the contracts discussed above, reformation for health 
reasons of continuing contractual obligations has no obvious precedent in 
American jurisprudence. Thus, any predictions about such relational 
agreements must be offered extremely tentatively. 
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And yet, since reformation often results from moments of paradigm-
shifting societal change, it would be unsurprising to see some opinions 
reforming obligation to make, say, the health risks of particular activities less 
likely.149 What would distinguish such reformation from previous episodes is 
that it could rest on neither fairness nor consent.  Rather, reformation of 
ongoing relationships to minimize external risks would form a new basis for 
the law of reformation. That foundation would be in some ways self-limiting—
a one-pandemic-in-a-century rate, if it holds, won’t scare commercial parties 
away from contracting.   
Still, it’s hard to know whether the genie of third-party health risks could 
be easily put back in the bottle.  After all, many long-term contracts cause health 
risks—think of the suppliers of products that are potentially carcinogenic, or 
sellers of high-caloric foods. Courts will need to be careful to consider limiting 
principles for health-risk-based reformation of long-term contracts in the 
Covid-19 era.   
CONCLUSION 
Ordinarily, risky contracts are managed through ex ante legislation and 
regulatory intervention. That leaves a vast sphere of private life subject to 
bargaining, even though most contracts externalize some risk onto the public 
at large. But sometimes, the risk calculus changes after formation, and society 
must turn to the less settled, predictable, and arguably legitimate ex post dispute 
resolution systems to manage public harms. Covid-19 provides a good example 
of contracts that cause unexpected risks.  Through judicial rescission, 
reinterpretation, and reformation, we anticipate that courts will recalibrate 
burden to acceptable levels. Because such moves are possible—and, indeed, 
because modern disputes often see compromise solutions already—parties to 
contracts today should seek to share the burdens that their agreements would 
seem to allocate. 
149 See, e.g., Phipps Group, LLC v. KCAKE Acquisition, Inc., et al., C.A. No. 2020-
0282-KSJM, transcript (Del. Ch. Apr. 17, 2020; filed Apr. 30, 2020) (declining to 
expedite case seeking to force buyer to close in light of health risks). 
  
